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NOTES

THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
GOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY
In the application of the doctrine of federal supremacy' two basic
questions of intergovernmental taxati6n are presented: the extent of the
Federal Government's power to tax state activities and the scope of the
immunity of federal activities from state taxation. The law as to the first
of these questions is, for all practical purposes, well settled,2 for, though
there was a period when reciprocal immunities from taxation were recognized,' the states today have lost any effective constitutional protection
from federal taxation of their functions. The Federal Government has
full tax powers exercisable at its discretion,4 and any tax benefits which
may be granted the states are attributable to political considerations on
the part of Congress and not to any constitutional limitations on this
taxing power.'
The more vital problem is that of the nature of the immunity of
federal functions from state taxation. The Federal Government in order
to operate properly must be free from state interference.' In the first
case involving a state tax on a branch of the Federal Government the tax
was distinctly discriminatory and clearly an attempt to challenge federal
supremacy; the Court would not tolerate this direct interference. 7 Situa1. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall established the doctrine of federal supremacy in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819).
2. For an excellent discussion of this problem see Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule
of Governmental Tax Iimunity-A Legal Myth, 11 FED. B.J. 3 (1950).
3. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U.S. 1871) ; Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U.S.
1 (1902) ; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) ; United States v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 17 Wall. 322 (U.S. 1873). See also the Court's determination
of the separation of powers between state and federal governments in the SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873).
4. From the high point reached in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U.S. 1871), the
Court slowly curtailed state immunities in the process of broadening the federal taxing
power.
In pronouncing the limitation of immunity to strictly state governmental activities
as distinguished from proprietory functions in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S.
437 (1905), the Court expressed fear that all the states might broaden their proprietory
activities to take over more fields of private enterprise, thus withdrawing a large source
of federal revenue. Id. at 454.
But the Court later proceeded to limit immunity by steps: Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269
U.S. 514 (1926) (withholding immunity from income received by private contractors for
work on a state governmental project) ; Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) (removal
of immunity on capital gains on sale of municipal bonds) ; Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304
U.S. 405 (1938) (removal of immunity from the income of a state employee). Finally,
the Court narrowed immunity to functions unique to a state, e.g., only a state can own a
statehouse; only a state can raise revenue by taxing. New York v. United States, 326

U.S. 572 (1946).
5.
6.
United
7.

New York v. United States, supra note 4, at 583.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819); Osborn v. Bank of the
States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U.S. 1824).
McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 6.
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tions soon developed in which the effect of a state tax was not so distinct. A nondiscriminatory tax levied on the income of a federal employee was held an interference with the Federal Governments by the
Court for the reason that it would necessitate higher compensation to
secure competent officials to perform Government functions; the state
income tax was held a tax on the source of the income, i.e., the Federal
Government.'
From this reasoning developed the "economic burden" test: Any
state tax which ultimately burdened the Federal Government was to be
held an unconstitutional interference on the part of the state.1" Administration of this test naturally required the Court to look behind matters of form to determine the actual economic consequences of each tax.
As a practical matter every state tax could conceivably be a burden, more
or less remote, upon the Government. The components of every manufactured product purchased by the Government, for example, may possibly be taxed by the states either directly or indirectly; employees of a
federal contractor may also be taxed and some effects of state taxes may
be passed on to the Federal Government when it purchases commodities
or services. Every new development in this area demanded solutions of
intricate and complex problems of degree," problems more properly re8. Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435 (U.S. 1842).
9. Id. at 448-449. See note 12 infra.
10. A state privilege tax on a dealer for storing gasoline later sold to the Federal
Government was held invalid. Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936). The Court,
in indicating how much the tax would burden the Government if collected, noticed several
points from the Government's brief. The total increase in cost of gasoline to the United
States Government in Alabama would amount to $143,145.54; if all the other states were
allowed a similar tax there would be a total increase in cost of $4,479,661.40 per year.
The Navy Department would also have had to pay the tax on its purchase of 273,354,228
gallons of fuel oil in 1934. Id. at 395, n.1.
State income tax on royalties received from patents was held invalid as a tax upon
the patent right itself. Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928). State tax on the
privilege of a citizen's selling gasoline measured by the number of gallons sold could not
be assessed on sales to the Federal Government. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277
U.S. 218 (1928). State income tax on a federal lessee of Indian lands was disallowed as
an interference with the Government's power to lease lands. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257
U.S. 501 (1922). See also Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S.
522 (1916), and Choctaw, 0. & G.R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914). But see note
12 infrc.
11. Property owned by a private person and used by him in performing services for
the Federal Government was always taxable by state and local governments levying ad
valorem property taxes. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949);
Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111 (1944); Choctaw, 0. & G.R.R. v. Mackey, 256 U.S. 531
(1921) ; Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U.S. 362 (1912) ; Central Pacific R. R.
v. California, 162 U.S. 91 (1896); Thomson v. Union Pacific R.R., 9 Wall. 579 (U.S.
1870). However, the Court would not allow the state to tax the privilege of a person's
doing business measured by the amount of gasoline sold to the Government. Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928). Perhaps the privilege tax was more of a
burden on the Government; however, the contractor would probably pass on to the
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solved by a legislature; the test was much too cumbersome and difficult
of application for a court. Since it was not feasible for the Court to
adhere strictly to this test, it soon limited federal immunity in cases in
which the "burden" was too remote or not definitely fixed. 2 There was
also a question of whether the individual employee or contractor should
be freed from his duty of supporting the state and local government*
merely because of the fact that he contracted with or was employed by
the Federal Government. These individuals were afforded the same
protection and services by those governments as other members of the
community." Decisions on these matters were increasingly recognized to
be of a legislative nature. 4
The most significant problems today are those concerning the costplus-a-fixed-fee contract under which the Federal Government assumes
any tax liability the contractor may incur. It was the Court's refusal to
use the "economic burden" test in cases involving cost-plus contracts that
marked the complete abandonment of that test, and, with its demise, the
Court ushered in the "legal incidence" concept. 5 Under this test judicial
Federal Government as much of the tax burden in the one case as in the other, accepting
a lower profit in both instances when competition demanded.
12. In 1928 the Court held that a state tax on the income from royalties from
patents was prohibited. Long v. Rockvood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928). However in Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932), the court expressly overruled Long v. Rockwood
and upheld a state tax on the gross receipts from copyrighted motion pictures, stating
that the effect upon the functions of the Federal Government by such a tax, if any, were
too remote to warrant consideration.
The states were permitted to tax the lessees of Indian lands in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), and the theory that a tax on income is
legally and economically a tax on its source (the Government in these cases) was overruled in Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). Two cases, Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928), and Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936), forbidding state tax on private contractors for business done for the Federal Government,
were both distinguished and limited to their particular facts in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 152 (1937), before being expressly overruled in Alabama v. King
& Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
"The contention ultimately rests upon the point that the tax increases the cost to
the Government of the service rendered by the taxpayer. But this is not necessarily so.
The contractor, taking into consideration the state of the competitive market for the
service, may be willing to bear the tax and absorb it in his estimated profit rather than
lose the contract." James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 159 (1937).
13. Though the purpose of granting federal immunity is to prevent undue interference by the states, the necessary consequences of the immunity. is to benefit the employees by relieving them from contributing their share to the financial support of the
local government. Also the Federal Government may be enabled to engage employees at
salaries lower than those paid for like services by other employers. See Graves v. New
York, 306 U.S. 466, 483 (1939).
14. For discussion of the change of attitude in this area see Spahr, The Leave-It-ToCongress Trend in the Constitutional Law of Tax Im,
nmities, 95 U. OF PA. L. R1v. 1
(1946). See also Powell, The WanLing of Intergovernmental Tax Imninunities, 58 HARv.
L. REv.633, 655 (1945) ; 40 MIcH.L. REV.457, 459 (1942).
15. In Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 8 (1941), the Court said: "The
Government, rightly, we think, disclaims any contention that the Constitution, unaided
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review is limited to a determination of what party and object is, as a
matter of form, taxed by the state.' 6 Neither the Government nor its
property may be the formal subject of the tax, for in the absence of permissive congressional action, the Constitution, by negative implication,
prohibits the states' taxing the Federal Government or its property. 7
The role of the Court has been restricted to applying this formal test and
invoking constitutional protection only when the Federal Government is
directly taxed. Any further protection for Governmental functions or
any waiver of the basic constitutional immunity are matters for the legislature. 8 This is analogous to the power of Congress to authorize the
states to regulate commerce."
Congress can either grant or withhold immunity from state taxes.2"
by congressional legislation, prohibits a tax exacted from the contractors merely because
it is passed on economically, by the terms of the contract or otherwise, as a part of the
construction cost to the Government."
16. In an early case, the Court said: "Who, in any particular transaction like the
present, is a 'purchaser' within the meaning of the statute, is a question of state law on
which only the Supreme Court of Alabama can speak -with final authority." Alabama v.
King & Boozer, supra note 15, at 9. The Court later qualified this statement by saying,
"The quotation refers, we think, only to the power of the state court to determine who
is responsible under its law for payment to the state of the exaction." Kern-Limerick
Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121 (1954).
In United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944), a private contractor
had leased some Government equipment for use in fulfilling a Government contract.
Pennsylvania levied an ad valorem tax on all the property in the contractor's plant including the federal property. Though the lessee was the formal taxpayer, the Court
did not allow the tax on the Government property. However, the state can still tax the
privilege of a contractor's doing business and measure the tax by property of"the Government, even though by the terms of the contract the Government pays all taxes. There is
no constitutional immunity for, technically, the incidence of the tax is on the private
contractor and the subject of the tax is the contractor's privilege of doing business.
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953).
17. Kern-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954); United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S.
21, 32 (1939) ; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
18. The Court states in one case: "We do not imply, by this decision, that Congress
does not have power to immunize these lessees from the taxes we think the Constitution
permits Oklahoma to impose in the absence of such action. The question whether immunity shall be extended in situations like these is essentially legislative in character."
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949).
19. See Leisy & Co. v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) ; In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545
(1891). In the Leisy case the Court invalidated a state statute regulating the sale of
liquor in interstate commerce. Congress then authorized the states to regulate or prohibit
the sale of liquor. This latter statute was not questioned in the Rahrer case which upheld a state law enacted pursuant to congressional authorization.
20. "Congress may curtail an immunity which might otherwise be implied . . . or
enlarge it beyond the point where, Congress being silent, the Court would set its limits."
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 411 n.1 (1938).
For instances where Congress has enlarged the scope of immunity see General
Electric Co. v. Washington, 347 U.S. 909 (1954) ; Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322
(1953); Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952) ; Lawrence v. Shaw, 300
U.S. 245 (1937).
For a case in which Congress waived Governmental immunity see
Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 995 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
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The only restriction on Congress in this area is that the Government
activity involved must be within the scope of Congress' constitutional
powers. The power of Congress to extend these immunities beyond the
narrow limits of self-executing constitutional immunity stems from its
power to make any laws necessary for exercising its delegated powers. 2
The determination of tax immunity policy is a matter uniquely legislative because it involves a balancing of the states' needs for revenue against
any possible detriment to the various federal activities. This is a problem
for that body most representative of the states and most able to develop a
flexible and consistent overall policy. 2 The Federal Government should
be unrestrained in the exercise of its proper functions, but, on the other
hand, a large federal contract, bringing thousands of workers into an area,
will throw a heavy burden on state and local governments. New homes
will be built requiring expansion of local physical facilities and increased
police and fire protection. If the federal contractor and his property are
granted tax immunity, the contractor may benefit from local and state
government services without cost to him. Further, if existing industries
in the area which would ordinarily bear the brunt of local taxation were
immunized when under a federal contract, the local government would
be deprived of its largest source of revenue. The benefits accruing from
the infusion of large amounts of capital into an area may, however,
greatly outweigh the burdens. The increased amount of money circulating in the area may be taxed every time it changes hands ;23 all business
will improve if unemployment is lowered and a strong economy will allow heavier taxation.
21. U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 426
(U.S. 1819) ; Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232, 234 (1952) ; Federal Land
Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102, 103 (1941); Pittman v. Home Owners'

Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21, 33 (1939).
22. For an insight into the approach of Congress to the problems in this area see
congressional debates on the question of whether certain Government contracts would
result in a burden or benefit to state and local governments. 88 CONG. REc. 2835, 3464
(1942) ; 86 CONG. REc. 7528, 7535 (1940).
Mr. Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion recently noted: "When the Congress
deliberates over this problem, as it often has, it does not worry about passing of title or
other legal technicalities. The Congress debates whether as a matter of policy, including
the need of the states for revenue, the holder of a cost-plus government contract should
be immunized from state taxation." Kern-Limerick v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 126 (1954).
Congress gave consideration in one situation to a showing of immense increase in
revenue collected by the states of California and Missouri due, in part at least, to
greatly increased federal expenditures in those states. Also given weight was the fact
that failure to extend immunity in this case would cost the Federal Government two to
three billion dollars a year. 88 CoNG. Rxc. 2835 (1942).
23. Representative Cochran pointed out that in Missouri and California there was
greatly increased revenue from sales taxes levied on the purchases of skilled and un-skilled labor, who received approximately 50 percent of the heavy national defense expenditure in those two states. (See note 22 supra.) 88 CONG. REc. 2835 (1942).
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At times Congress will grant immunity and provide payments in lieu
of taxes to compensate the state and local governments.24 In these situations, if taxation were allowed, the state and local governments might be
unduly benefitted at the expense of the other states ;25 but, if no compensation were provided, a state might be severely handicapped. The
use of "in lieu" payments allows the Federal Government and not the
various states to determine what is a reasonable compensation.
If the states consider themselves unduly deprived of revenue by any
legislative action in granting immunity, they can effectively exert pressure on Congress. When Congress extended immunity to parties contracting with the Atomic Energy Commission, -6 the state governors, feeling the danger to the states from loss of revenue, passed a resolution at
their annual convention requesting that the immunity be repealed.2 7 Upon
reconsideration and after hearing from the Bureau of the Budget2 ' and
the AEC itself, 29 Congress amended the Act to exclude express im24.

For example, Congress required TVA to pay a certain percentage of the gross

receipts from the sale of power for each fiscal year to state and local governments in the
TVA area in lieu of tax money. 48 STAT. 66 (1933), as amended, 54 STAT. 66 (1940), 16
U.S.C. § 831 (1) (1952).
In the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 the Commission was authorized to make payments
in lieu of property taxes to render financial assistance to those states and localities in
which the Commission acquired property previously taxable by the state and local governments. 60 STAT. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b) (1952), as amended, 67 STAT. 575
(1953), 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b) (Supp. 1954).
25. Naturally, due to the concentration of industry in certain parts of the country,
differences in climate, and other significant factors, Government contracts cannot be
equally apportioned among the states. See Powell, supra note 14, at 653.
26. 60 STAT. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b) (1952). See General Electric Co. v.
Washington, 347 U.S. 909 (1954) ; Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
27. See Resolution Adopted by the Governors' Conference, 44th Annual Meeting,
Houston, Tex., June 29-July 2, 1952, in SEN. REP. No. 694, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1953). The main reason presented by the governors in urging repeal of express congressional immunity was that such immunity would seriously interfere with state and
local powers of taxation.
28. The Bureau of the Budget reported that, whatever may have been the considerations involved when the Atomic Energy Act was adopted in 1946, no compelling
reason then existed for reserving to the AEC a greater immunity from state and local
taxation than that given to federal agencies and instrumentalities generally. Id. at -.
29. Representatives of the AEC stated that retention of immunity was desirable
from the viewpoint of the Commission, but they acknowledged that there might be overriding considerations of policy in the field of federal-state-local fiscal relationships which
they could not evaluate. The Commission did indicate that repeal of this immunity would
increase the cost of the program several million dollars annually, and that the Commission's immunity was not like an exemption for an existing industry which had been contributing to the support of local and state governments. Here the extent to which these
activities had exempted previously taxable operations was overshadowed by the creation
of vast new economic activity where none existed before.
The cost of supplying the additional public services and facilities required because
of this program had been largely borne by the Federal Government. The Commission
finally contended that local governments burdened by the advent of new industry would
be better protected by the in lieu payments than taxation. Id. at -.
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munity.Y

If Congress remains silent, the departments of the executive branch
have the power to extend immunity by wording their contracts so that the

legal incidence of the state tax will fall on the Government or on its
property;31 then the tax can not be collected.

The department acting

within its authority cannot be attacked for intentionally contracting so as
to conserve federal funds32 since it is to be expected that, without a contrary mandate from Congress, the department will always exercise its

discretion in the best interests of the Federal Government. The executive departments engaging 'directly in various activities, would not
have to pay the state taxes

;33

but usually the departments will not have

necessary facilities and must enlist the services of private businesses.
This difference in methods should not give the states a windfall. Several
questions of policy that ultimately affect state revenues are left to the discretion of the executive branch. In the exercise of this discretion it has'
been exepressly requested to contract with small business whenever possible.34

When in lieu payments are substituted for state taxation, the

executive may be empowered to determine the amount of those payments.3"
When Congress has failed to act, and the executive has contracted
with the intent of avoiding state tax laws, the states may challenge the
scope of the executive's authority. 6 This problem requires judicial resolution; the courts and ultimately the United States Supreme Court are
necessarily called upon to keep the other branches of the Government
within their proper sphere.

This is another function of the Court in the

field of intergovernmental taxation, but here, also, the Court's role is
30. 60 STAT. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b) (1952), as amended, 67
(1953), 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b) (Supp. 1954).

STAT.

575

31. "But since purchases by independent contractors of supplies for Government
construction or other activities do not have federal immunity from taxation, the form of
contracts, when governmental immunity is not waived by Congress, may determine the
effect of state taxation on federal agencies, for decisions consistently prohibit taxes levied
on the property or purchases of the Government itself." Kern-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock,
347 U.S. 110, 122 1954).
32. Ibid.
33. Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943); New York ex rel. Rogers v.
Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937).
34. 62 STAT.21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. § 151 (b) (1952).
35. The AEC vas granted authority to give in lieu payments in the amounts, at
those times, and upon terms it deemed appropriate. The Commission was not to make
payments exceeding what would have been payable if the property had remained in private
hands in the condition in which it was when acquired except in certain instances, of
increased burden upon the state. 60 STAT. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b) (1952), as
amended, 67 STAT. 575 (1953), 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b) (Supp. 1954).
36. See Kern-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954). The state court in
this case had held that the Navy Department was not authorized to buy materials or
equipment for the construction of an ammunition dump and that the private contractor
was the purchaser who could be taxed. The Supreme Court held .that the state's interpretation of the Procurement Act was too restrictive, and disallowed the tax. Ibid.
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almost completely one of defining the limits of the various departments'
Actually, Congress, through its appropriations
statutory authority."
effective check against any abuse of executive
more
a
much
holds
power,
authority. Congress has also set up its own policing system through the
Comptroller General who has the duty to report annually to Congress any
unauthorized contracts.8 8
Litigation in this area today involves no basic constitutional problems but represents merely an administration of the legal incidence test
through the application of general contract and state tax law. At first,
cost-plus contracts were written without regard to the form necessary to
9
make the Government or its property the object taxed. The states were
thus allowed to tax contractors even though the cost of the tax was ul4
timately imposed on the Government by the terms of the contracts. " To
insulate itself from state taxation the Government made itself the purchaser of materials needed for performance of a cost-plus contract thus
precluding the imposition of state sales taxes.4"
With the purpose of capturing as
the states revamped their tax laws to
For example, Tennessee replaced the
Government's property 3 with a tax on

much federal revenue as possible
tax the Government indirectly. 2
prohibited direct levy upon the
the privilege of storing federally-

37. Kern-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954). The Court centered its
consideration on the extent of the authority Congress had resided in the Navy Department to contract.
38. 42 STAT. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 53 (c) (1952).
39. This was readily apparent in the situation involved in Alabama v. King &
Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). There, Alabama attempted to tax lumber sold for construction of an army camp. The state sales tax was one imposed on the purchaser and
the sole defense by the Government was that it was the real purchaser by the terms of
the cost-plus contract. The Supreme Court held the contractor was the actual purchaser
since the Government was not obligated to pay for the lumber at the time of purchase
but only after acceptance in writing by the Contracting Officer. Id. at 13.
40. For other instances of Government failure to protect itself in the contracting
process see Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953); Curry v. United
States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941).
41. Kern-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954). The Court distinguished
Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941), on the ground that the Government was
bound by the purchase of the contractor without need of acceptance by the Government
Contracting Officer.
42. Commentators had early recognized the possibility of an indirect tax from application of the legal incidence test: "It would be possible however, for the states to
thwart the Federal Government's efforts at tax avoidance by changing from a buyer's
to a seller's sales tax, since, as the present case [Alabama v. King & Boozer] establishes,
the test for governmental immunity is whether the tax is placed 'directly' on the Government." 9 U. OF CHi. L. REv.351, 356 (1942).
43. See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) ; Van Brocklin v.
Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
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owned gasoline." The tax was measured by the amount of Government
gasoline that was stored. Technically this type of tax is not on Government property,45 and, with the courts recognizing the distinction, the states
were able to circumvent the constitutional bar against a direct tax of
federal property.48 The executive department was educated to insure
against a recurrence of this result in the instant case by leasing the tanks
7
instead of merely contracting for storage space.1
Since it is clear that the Federal Government cannot be taxed as a
purchaser," some states currently impose a sales tax on retailers. In
determining the basis for the tax the sellers have to include receipts from
sales to immune federal agencies." The burden of the tax falls on all
44. During World War II the Federal Government contracted to store part of its
gasoline in storage tanks owned by Esso Standard Oil. The Government gasoline was
expressly exempted from all state storage and use taxes. The Government agreed to
assume liability of Esso for any state taxes. The Court held that Tennessee was not
levying a tax on Government property but on Esso's privilege to store gasoline; the tax
was thus collectable. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953).
45. The Court distinguished the earlier cases disallowing a tax on federal property
(supra note 44) on very technical grounds. It pointed out that in the Allegheny case the
value of the federal property was, in part, the measure of the tax; and, in substance, that
amounted to an ad valorem tax on Government property. The tax in Esso, the Court
stated, was imposed because Esso stored the gasoline and was not on the worth of the
Government's property. The tax was still graduated to the amount of gasoline stored.
Id. at 499.
46. In cases involving state attempts to tax interstate commerce an analogous problem arises. Privilege taxes levied on the manufacturing process are permitted even
though measured by the value of the goods produced and not allowing for the value of
those goods which would be shipped in interstate commerce. These privilege taxes are
permitted on the theory that it would be unfair for interstate business to escape paying
its share for the advantages it receives from the state and local governments. American
Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). See also Michigan-Wisconsin
Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954) ; Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.,
336 U.S. 169 (1949) ; Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) ;
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) ; Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,
274 U.S. 284 (1927).
Although the construction of the state statute by the state court is binding on the
Supreme Court, it is not determinative of whether the tax deprives the taxpayer of a
federal right. This latter consideration turns, not on the characterization given the tax
by the state, but on its operation and effect. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of
Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946). Where a federal right is involved, the Court never
considers itself bound by the state court's interpretation. United States v. Allegheny
County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) ; Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
The reason given above for allowing the privilege tax in the interstate commerce
cases might not be applicable to the field of intergovernmental immunities. It can be seen
that, however, in both situations the Court is able to extricate itself from a very difficult
area by adopting the distinction between a tax on privilege as opposed to a direct tax.
47. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495, 500 (1953).
48. See note 41 supra.
49. Federal Reserve Bank v. Dep't of Revenue, 339 Mich. 587, 64 N.W.2d 639
(1954). The Federal Reserve Bank in this case brought an action to question whether
persons selling at retail were required, pursuant to a Michigan tax law, to include in the
amount of their gross receipts, proceeds derived from sales to the Bank. The Federal
Reserve Bank was expressly exempted from state taxes. 40 STAT. 1314 (1919), 12 U.S.C.
§ 531 (1952). The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the statute was valid as imposing
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purchasers, the Government paying its proportionate share. While the
legal incidence of this tax is on a private party, the subject of the tax includes receipts from the Federal Government. Under the legal incidence
test the subject of the tax must also be property of a private interest."
The question is whether receipts from the Federal Government in the
hands of the seller maintain their immune status, and, if the Court decides that they do, a sales tax on these gross receipts would be uncollectable to the extent of that property. This tax on the seller's receipts is the
most-recent essay by the states to tax indirectly the Federal Government,
and the validity of the attempt will ultimately have to be interpreted by
the Supreme Court. 1
The Court has adopted the legal incidence test to extricate itself from
complex and involved policy decisions required under the earlier approach.
The new test is easy to apply since matters of policy do not enter into the
actual process of decision. The Court's role is limited to an interpretation
of the contracts and the protection of the Government and its property
from a direct state tax. Matters of policy are left to Congress and the
executive although it is clear that the Court can make no decision without
its having a marked practical effect on the employment of federal funds."
Constitutional questions are settled: Self-executing immunity extends
only to the Federal Government, itself, and its property; the Court need
only interpret legal arrangements to determine when these constitutional
limits have been crossed. The formalistic approach taken by the Court
should not engender much litigation since the aggrieved parties need
look primarily to Congress for relief. If Congress has remained silent
and the executive, through its contracts, properly invokes the Government's constitutional immunity, then the Court should enforce that policy.
Through its approach the Court has left basic policy decisions for the
proper branches of Government.
a tax on one selling to the Government and not "on" the Government as a purchaser. This
is comparable to the decision in Kern-Limerick distinguishing the King & Boozer case.

In both situations the Government actually pays the tax.
The United States Supreme Court had held earlier that a state could not collect a
tax on sales to the Federal Land Bank, an agency granted express immunity by Congress.
Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941). The Michigan court
saw the North Dakota Act as imposing the legal incidence of the tax on the purchaser
while the Mihigan Act imposed it on the seller. Federal Reserve Bank v. Department
of Revenue, 339 Mich. 587, 601, 64 N.W.2d 639, 646 (1954).
50. See note 16 supra.
51. When Congress grants an express immunity as it has to the Federal Reserve
Banks, its intention is clear. The decision in Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S.
232 (1952), suggests that when Congress has granted an express immunity, the Court will
give it a liberal construction. Id. at 236.
52. Either the state will collect a substantial sum or that amount will be available to
the department for accomplishing its objectives.

In Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345

U.S. 495, 496 (1953), liability for over $4,000,000 rested on the Court's decision.

